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Economics against Culture: 
A Lebanese Controversy
The civil war in Lebanon took place between 1975 and 1990, nearly a quar-
ter-century before the wave of low-intensity conflicts that plagued numer-
ous countries in Africa, Southern Europe, and the Middle East. Even a
decade and a half after the adoption of the Taif agreement that put an official
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end to the fighting,1 specialists on Lebanon remain divided between two
schools of analysis. Some see the Lebanese civil war as a portent of the
“war of cultures” that underlies international relations in the age of global-
ization.2 Others insist on its economic dimensions and on the strategies of
rational actors taking advantage of the breakdown of the rule of law.3
The first group relies on convincing arguments. Because of Lebanon’s
unique character in the Middle East—its population more or less evenly
distributed between Muslims and Christians on the eve of the war, its cul-
tural attachment to Western and at the same time to Arab norms and val-
ues, and its adoption of consensus democracy ensuring the domination of
a multisectarian oligarchy4—tensions between identities, between beliefs,
and between ideologies played a major role in igniting the conflict as well
as in spreading it by means of antagonistic martial propaganda. From the
start, the leaders of the warring parties described their enemy in essential-
ist terms (it was a war between Islam and the West) and interpreted the war
using cultural concepts (ethnic antagonism, or a conflict between “tradi-
tional authoritarian” and “modern democratic” values). Their explanations
received a large popular echo because the shared culture of Lebanese soci-
ety in the mid–twentieth century was permeated by the memory of past
intercommunal hostility, making groups vulnerable to ideological provo-
cation and strategic mobilization. An ahistorical interpretation gained ground,
fed by the repressed collective memory of intercommunal massacres in
the 1860s.5 Among each of the seventeen sectarian groups that made up
the Lebanese nation, a view began to prevail that religious creed and the
survival of minorities were threatened by hostile ethnic groups. In a sweep-
ing dichotomization, the war was deemed a Muslim jihâd, or a Christian
24 Elizabeth Picard
1Having been summoned to a conclave in Taif, Saudi Arabia, in October–November
1989, fifty-eight of the ninety-nine members of Parliament adopted, under heavy re-
gional (mainly Syrian) and international (mainly American) pressure, the Document of
National Reconciliation, which contained various amendments to the constitutional sys-
tem. See Joseph Maila, The Document of National Reconciliation: A Commentary,
Prospects for Lebanon 4 (Oxford: Centre for Lebanese Studies, 1992).
2For an example of this school, see Walid Phares, Lebanese Christian Nationalism:
The Rise and Fall of an Ethnic Resistance (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1995).
3See, e.g., the famous Lebanese economist Kamal Hamdan, Le conflit libanai
(Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 1997).
4Elizabeth Picard, Lebanon: A Shattered Country (New York: Holmes and Meier,
2002).
5Leila Tarazi Fawaz, An Occasion for War: Civil Conflict in Lebanon and Da-
mascus in 1860 (London: I. B. Tauris, 1994).
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crusade, for the promotion of the “true” faith on the Lebanese land, by ex-
pelling (in the first case) or subjugating (in the second case) the believers of
the other faith who, in turn, thought they were rightly defending themselves
against such a threat.
Needless to say, several characteristics of the war belied this rigid iden-
tity framework of analysis; namely, the frequent occurrence of intracom-
munal divisions and intercommunal alliances and cooperation. For example,
Shiite Muslims, often depicted as the unanimously frustrated Lebanese re-
ligious community, deemed to form the bulk of insurgency,6 were divided
into many regional subgroups and as many ideological factions. Some chose
to stay in Christian-dominated areas; several notables of the community
remained opposed to the insurgency and preferred to abide by the old in-
tersectarian elite pact; moreover, among the Shia, the mainstream opposi-
tion movement split between the rival Islamist movements of Amal and
Hizbollah. While Amal fought the Palestinian guerrillas based in the coun-
try and tried to put up with the Israeli occupation of South Lebanon after
1982, Hizbollah supported the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
and led the resistance against the Israeli Defense Force under Syrian and
Iranian patronage. In the end, both factions waged a direct intracommunal
war in Beirut’s southern suburbs that only ended with a Syrian diktat in
December 1990.
Similarly, the internal history of the Christian camp during the war was
punctuated by rivalries and fratricidal conflicts that culminated in a two-
year war between the Christian fraction of the national army commanded
by General Michel Aoun and the main Christian militia group (the Lebanese
Forces) in 1989–90, until their common subjugation by Syria. To make the
picture more complex, each Christian faction established alliances within
the opposite camp. Thus, the Lebanese Forces, whose project was to estab-
lish a Christian-dominated state and expel the Palestinians from Lebanese
soil, helped PLO fighters to land in the area they controlled in order to go
on fighting Amal Shiite militia forces in the 1980s. At the same period, they
organized a shared control of Beirut’s southeastern suburbs with Hizbollah,
ideologically their worst enemy. If it is assumed that the rationale for con-
flict is to win and that belief and collective identity were the central stakes
of the war, much of the behavior on all sides seems unconvincing, not to say
bizarre.
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6Augustus R. Norton, Amal and the Shi’a: Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1987).
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In spite of all the qualifications and difficulties in understanding the
Lebanese war as a “war of cultures,” the fact remains that creed was a pow-
erful driving force during the fifteen years of fighting. This was all the more
important given the fact that the leaders of the warring parties declared
creed to be central in their strategic choices and that the populace in each
camp saw it at the heart of their commitment.
However, as convincing as “creed” may be in analyzing the Lebanese
war, the notion is not inconsistent with other explanations of the Leba-
nese civil war that refer to need and greed factors and, more broadly, to
economic variables. Like any other human being, the Lebanese is an homo
economicus as much as a political animal. It is necessary to take into ac-
count the material realities too easily hidden under ideological discourse
and cultural superstructures in order to reconcile the apparent contradic-
tions of the war. In the two decades before the outburst of violence, rapid
growth benefited a limited monopolistic upper class, which contrasted
with the proletarianization of masses of rural migrants. At the same time,
a large range of middle-class employees and independent workers suffered
from the deterioration of their working and living conditions.7 As I have
argued elsewhere, the “need” factor in the outburst of the civil war could
be analyzed in terms of relative deprivation; economic inequalities became
blatant within each sectarian group, in which rich individuals contrasted
with a mass of laborers and a large urban subproletariat.8 Because of the
territorialization of religious groups, the contrast between affluence in
Beirut and central Lebanon and underdevelopment on the peripheries
overlapped with the sectarian divide, allowing an interpretation of social
inequalities in terms of religious differences and giving ground to sectar-
ian strife.
Certainly, war did not put an end to economic inequalities and popu-
lar frustration—far from it. From the start, the war occasioned systematic
economic destruction that affected the population of all regions and com-
26 Elizabeth Picard
7Salim Nasr, “The Crisis of Lebanese Capitalism,” MERIP 73 (December 1978).
Here, the Lebanese situation diverges from World Bank economist Paul Collier’s find-
ing that “a prior period of rapid economic decline increases the risk of conflict” (em-
phasis added). See Paul Collier, “Doing Well of War: An Economic Perspective,” in
Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars, ed. Mats Berdal and David
Malone (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2000), 97.
8See Ted Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970);
and Elizabeth Picard, “The Lebanese Shî’a and Political Violence,” in The Legitimiza-
tion of Violence, ed. David Apter (London: Macmillan, 1997).
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munities,9 while the drastic impoverishment of middle classes went hand-
in-hand with the accumulation of amazing wealth. Although the model 
of conflict laid out by Paul Collier—a model privileging motivations of
greed—should not be applied to the Lebanese civil war without strong qual-
ification,10 greed incited warlords and political entrepreneurs to take advan-
tage of the breakdown of state authority, as social insecurity offered grow-
ing opportunities of predation by armed groups.11 Over a period of fifteen
years, they imposed a new social and economic order that came to be known
as “Lebanization” and was imitated in several civil wars.12
Far from being a hiatus of exceptional circumstances, the war was prepa-
ration for future economic developments in the country, while economi-
cally motivated violence gave way to new and unprecedented peacetime
corruption.13 In the period of reconstruction that followed, not only were
agriculture and industry unable to recover the position they had occupied in
the prewar Lebanese economy, but the structure of the national economy
also showed growing distortions; by 1998, interest represented 23 per-
cent of gross national product (GNP). Two sectors—land and money—
monopolized national wealth and imposed their logic on every economic
activity, while emigration, mostly of young degree holders, reached the dra-
matic cumulative figure of 950,000 people between 1994 and 2000 in a
country of 3.5 to 4 million.14
More than two decades after the end of the Lebanese civil war, scholars
have rightly focused attention on the economic rationales underlying identity
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9The destruction of the industrial zones in the eastern and southern Beirut suburbs
deprived workers from all religious communities of their salaries and revenues.
10The model raises reservations about his periodicization of wars, the social cate-
gories it relies on, and its absence of diachronic comparison. See Paul Collier, Economic
Causes of Civil Conflict and Their Implications for Policy (Washington, D.C.: World
Bank, 2000).
11Elizabeth Picard, “The Political Economy of Civil War in Lebanon,” in War,
Institutions and Social Change in the Middle East, ed. Steven Heydemann (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 2000).
12Joyce Starr, “Lebanon’s Economy: the Cost of Protracted Violence,” in The Emer-
gence of a New Lebanon: Fantasy or Reality, ed. Edward Azar (New York: Praeger,
1984); Nasser Saidi, “Economic Consequences of the War in Lebanon,” Bulletin
Trimestriel de la Banque du Liban, 1986, 29–30.
13Sena Eken, Paul Cashin, S. Nuri Erbas, José Martinelo, and Adnan Mazarei Eco-
nomic Dislocation and Recovery in Lebanon (Washington, D.C.: International Mone-
tary Fund, 1995). 
14Republic of Lebanon, Administration Centrale de la Statistique, Monthly Bulletin.
1994–2000.
ch02_7041_Arnson_WWCP  4/15/05  1:34 PM  Page 27
conflicts. Nevertheless, an analysis of the war based on political economy,
which takes into account interests and rational strategies, is not inconsistent
with the interpretation of these interests and strategies within what Max
Weber would call a “web of meanings” that makes up the culture of the
actors.15 Understanding the Lebanese case involves drawing on both per-
spectives: Just as the cultural explanation has an economic dimension, so an
economic explanation has to rely on a cultural interpretation of the context
surrounding competing strategies.16
This chapter discusses three wartime economic activities pertaining to
Lebanon’s main commodities and resources: (1) the trafficking in illegal
or legal goods, (2) land speculation, and (3) emigration. Each factor had a
particular relation to war making, by provoking, sustaining, or prolonging
armed conflict. In paying attention to these economic dimensions, the chap-
ter relates them to issues of political competition and social representa-
tion. The aim is to analyze the war not as a mechanical, reified process but
rather as a total social fact.17
Studying drug trafficking (and oil smuggling), land speculation, and the
role of the war émigrés during the war, demonstrates, first, that economic
interests and rational strategies as well as primordial identities and group
solidarities are independent variables that help explain the outbreak, trans-
formation, and prolongation of the war. Second, examining the role of re-
sources suggests that time is at the heart of the interaction between need and
greed on the one hand, and creed on the other. Time refers not only to the
change in the relative importance of each variable over the fifteen years of
war, when need and creed were progressively superseded by the crude and
growing greed of the antagonist parties. The concept of time also suggests
28 Elizabeth Picard
15Max Weber, “Religious Rejections of the World and their Directions,” in From
Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, ed. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1958), esp. 323–24.
16Jean Leca, “L’économie contre la culture dans l’explication des dynamiques poli-
tiques,” Bulletin du CEDEJ (1988): 23.
17Ideally, the chapter would also have included a discussion of the banking and fi-
nancial sectors, as banks turned from surrogates for the collapsed political system into
agents suspected of money laundering. However, given the difficulties in obtaining in-
formation on this subject in a country protected by banking secrecy, as well as the overly
technical dimensions of banking and finance, the subject is left out. Other important
aspects of wartime economic activities, such as plundering and looting, are also left
aside. On the role of the banking system, see Clement Henry Moore, “Prisoner’s Fi-
nancial Dilemma: A Consociational Future for Lebanon?” American Political Science
Review, March 1987.
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that the reliance on different kinds of goods or commodities to support war
expenses implied a different relation to time and, subsequently, inclined
various actors to give priority to either their economic interests or their
cultural values.
The following discussion of the Lebanese conflict’s economic rationales
and identity politics in relation to issues of time follows four central argu-
ments. First, because drugs (and oil) were rapidly produced, easily moved,
and immediately consumed goods, the enormous profits they generated
were threatened by the return of the state and its concomitant imposition
of legality and regulations. As these short-time activities became more and
more intense, profit became the main driving force behind the fighting, at
the expense of political and ideological rationales. Second, a warring party’s
reliance on land speculation helped maintain a balance between economic
and cultural logic behind the war. On the one hand were the huge financial
benefits derived from real estate sales and rentals, as well as from housing
construction for refugees who moved back and forth according to the
rhythm of battle. On the other hand, however, lay the aspiration for a secure,
homogeneous cultural environment and the desire to control land and prop-
erty in the long term, an aspiration that privileged identity politics. Third,
financial support from war expatriates and the Lebanese diaspora helped re-
inforce the military power of various militia groups, raising the level of
fighting and thus immediately aggravating the consequences of the war.
This support from abroad, however, was often detached from local strate-
gic, economic, and political priorities, because it stemmed from a timeless
utopian perspective born far outside the country’s realities. And fourth, the
fullest explanation of Lebanon’s civil war requires that its ideological and
economic dimensions be analyzed within a broader sociological and his-
torical framework.
Trafficking and the Resource of Illegality
The cultivation, commercialization, and consumption of hashish have been
part of the habits of Middle Eastern societies for centuries. Though con-
sumers could be found among Lebanese of all social classes, most of the
local production was traditionally exported, mainly to Egypt and, since the
1950s, to Israel and Europe. Such trafficking was more than tolerated by
the Lebanese state, whose political elite was notoriously involved in hashish
smuggling—one of the country’s many lucrative trades. In 1974, the head
of state himself, President Sleiman Frangieh, had his luggage searched by
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narcotics agents upon his arrival in New York for the annual meeting of
the UN General Assembly. Although the search turned up nothing and
caused a diplomatic incident, and it was not initiated arbitrarily, because ru-
mors put his son Tony high on the long list of Lebanese drug dealers.18
At the time, Lebanon was not in a state of war, and its institutions for-
bidding drug consumption and punishing related activities had not col-
lapsed. But there was a tacit collusion between its political and even judi-
cial elites to turn a blind eye to the illegal activity for their common benefit.
Limitations and sanctions emanated from the international arena only.
Hashish, and eventually poppies, were cultivated in remote mountain areas,
especially in the northern Beqaa Valley and in Hermel, regions from which
public administration, police, and security services had been noticeably
absent since the creation of the state, despite efforts during the presidency
of Fuad Shihab (1958–66). The absence of clearly demarcated borders be-
tween Syria and Lebanon—a situation that continues to this day—added
to the permissive environment in which drug trafficking flourished. The
permeable frontier facilitated crossings by a variety of legal and illegal
dealers, including gold smugglers from Kurdish tribes.19 Local Shiite clans
prospered thanks to the production and export of hashish, with the com-
plicity of Lebanese as well as Syrian customs and security officers. Such
actions contributed to rather than resulting from the eventual collapse of
the state.
The civil war brought a quantitative and qualitative modification to the
combination of social and political power, financial accumulation, and
exercise of violence surrounding illegal drug-related activities. The war
did not initiate them, for these activities had existed before. Nor is there
any indication that the war was ignited by drug bosses’ “greed,” for the
drug economy had functioned virtually unchecked, leaving drug lords
prosperous and, for the most part, safe. What the war did provoke was the
entry of new actors and an unprecedented rise in the level of illegal activ-
ity. First, there was a rise in Lebanese drug consumption, especially among
fighters of all groups, who used narcotics to enhance their faith and
morale. War reporters, personal testimonies, and the postwar literature all
30 Elizabeth Picard
18According to the Washington Post correspondent in Beirut ten years later, Tony
made $300 million a year through the export of hashish. See Jonathan Randal, Going All
the Way: Christian Warlords, Israeli Adventurers and the War in Lebanon (New York:
Vintage Books, 1984), 157.
19E.g., after the spring harvest, nomad sheep breeders from Syria used to wander
through the eastern and northern peripheries of Lebanon.
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attest to this phenomenon. Second, the disruption of food market networks
and the massive and repeated exodus from war zones caused a nearly com-
plete breakdown of traditional agriculture.20 Neither religious prejudice
nor the fear of state police prevented the remaining farmers from turning
to more lucrative crops. The rapid development of hashish and poppy pro-
duction evidenced the distortions of an economy that fulfilled immediate
financial needs without taking long-term interests into account. The area
used for growing hashish doubled between 1976 and 1984, and did so again
in 1988.21
Likewise, between 1984 and 1988, and guided by Kurdish experts under
the protection of the Syrian army, the area of poppy cultivation increased
from 60 to 3,000 hectares. Drug income gave rise to sudden and ostenta-
tious prosperity in rural areas of Hermel and the Beqaa, where Shiite as
well as Christian farmers built oversized Riviera-style villas for them-
selves.22 This sudden and short-lived prosperity occurred precisely during
the period in which several revolutionary movements—the Armenian
ASALA, the Kurdish PKK, the pro-Syrian Palestinian Salvation Front, and
finally the Lebanese Hizbollah—established barracks and headquarters in
this remote area under Syria’s umbrella. The drug culture thus developed 
in a heavily militarized region that was also a political no-man’s-land.
The costs of waging war certainly provided a strong incentive for mili-
tia groups to enter into and expand drug activities. At the outset of the war,
most militias were only local self-defense organizations formed in response
to real or imagined threats. They developed a symbiotic relationship with
the population from which they had sprung, sharing its sectarian identity
and living off the looting of territories under their control—both the terri-
tories they protected and those they attacked. However, as the objectives
of the warring parties became more and more obscure, the civilian population
suffered a rate of casualties as high as the “combatants,” as snipers and
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20On the eve of the war (1974), the primary sector provided a mere 9 percent of the
country’s GNP and Lebanon’s dependence on imported grains amounted to 76 percent.
21Hashish cultivation covered 80 percent of the cultivated surface area in the region
of northern Biqaa and Hermel, according to Al-Nahar, September 25, 1985.
22For a description of this restructuring, see Hassan Makhlouf, Culture et commerce
de drogue au Liban (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1994). See also “Face à la mafia de la drogue,”
Le Commerce du Levant 5703 (1993); U.S. Department of State, International Nar-
cotics Control Strategy Report (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1990). Salim Nasr gives some figures, without citing sources, in “Lebanon’s War: Is the
End in Sight?” MERIP 162 (January–February 1990); the same numbers appeared in
L’Express, April 30–May 7, 1987, citing the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration.
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raiders targeted mainly civilians. Throughout the 1980s, and culminating
with civilian protests in 1987, relations between the minority of combatants
that took advantage of the conflict, and the masses that suffered from the
war deteriorated.23
Relations also worsened as the economic situation grew more dire, as
Lebanon became deprived of the two external rents that had sustained do-
mestic consumption during the early years of the war. First, PLO expendi-
tures in Lebanon shrunk from $1 billion a year to a fifth of that following
the expulsion of Yasser Arafat and his men from Beirut by Israel in 1982.24
Second, after 1984, oil prices began to slide on the world market, carrying
with them a drastic diminution of financial support from rich Arab coun-
tries to the various fighting factions in Lebanon as well as to the Lebanese
state. As a consequence of civilian estrangement and economic crisis, the
larger militias (the Lebanese Forces among the Christians, the Druze Parti
Socialiste Progressiste, and Amal and Hizbollah among the Shia) turned
into professional organizations whose members were paid wages. About
one-sixth of the male population joined the militias at one time or another
during the war, receiving between $60 and $350 a month.25 Added to the
cost of equipment and ammunition, the war cost Lebanon several hundred
million dollars year for fifteen years. Drugs, in some respects, were a di-
rect response of the militias to the extraordinary demands of war making.
Yet, in a logic described by Charles Tilly,26 drugs also provided for mas-
sive capital accumulation among leaders and various middlemen, because
the profits from drug processing, transport, and commercialization were
immeasurable.27
32 Elizabeth Picard
23Ghassan Slaiby, “Les actions collectives de résistance civile à la guerre,” in Le
Liban d’aujourd’hui, ed. F. Kiwan (Paris: CNRS Éditions, 1993).
24After being under siege in West Beirut from June to September 1982, PLO forces
left by sea and land under the protection of the Multilateral Force. See Rashid Khalidi,
Under Siege: P.L.O. Decisionmaking during the 1982 War (New York: Columbia Uni-
versity Press, 1986).
25
“Liban: L’argent des milices,” Cahiers de l’Orient 10 (1988); Al-Hayat, January
31–February 8, 1990.
26Charles Tilly, “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,” in Bringing
the State Back In, ed. Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). Some of the Lebanese warlords
(among the Christians and the Druze) aimed to build their independent state.
27According to Georges Corm, “The War System: Militia Hegemony and Reestab-
lishment of the State,” in Peace for Lebanon: From War to Reconstruction, ed. Deirdre
Collings (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1994), the figure is $700 million per year;
Le Commerce du Levant, July 11, 1988, gives a figure of $1 billion.
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As described above, the traditional trivialization of hashish growing and
drug consumption in the Middle East contributed to decriminalizing the
agricultural shift of the war. Financial incentives combined with physical
threats easily convinced hesitant farmers to cultivate drug-producing crops.
That said, another crucial factor in the dramatic growth of the narcotics
economy was the transcommunal and interregional cooperation among
militias—cooperation that developed beyond the religious divide. Indeed,
the image of ethnic and religious fragmentation of wartime Lebanon should
be tempered by the acknowledgment that markets operated not only within
but also across newly created territorial boundaries, producing forms of
interaction—and even of interdependence and cooperation—that seemed
almost out of place given the intensity of violence between highly polarized
communities. Such cooperation started as early as the autumn of 1975,
when the souqs (markets) and port of Beirut were being sacked. At the time,
it took the form of various mechanisms of compensation and supervision
between regions—mechanisms that depended, ultimately, on personal trust,
notwithstanding the national, sectarian, and family affiliations of the par-
ties. Thus, the narcotics trade provided a large opportunity to turn the
wartime economy into a strategic resource: Far from being an obstacle to
trafficking, the division of Lebanon into several quasi-autonomous statelets
increased the rents from the drug trade.
The cooperation among militias was organized around multiple, cross-
sectarian economic networks that negotiated specific divisions of labor:
taxing farmers, supervising processing and packaging in remote clandestine
plants, and carrying the drugs to the many illegal harbors on the Lebanese
coast and from there to various intermediary points (such as West Africa) or
final destinations. For purposes of drug trafficking, Amal was associated
with the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), and Hizbollah with the pro-
Syrian militia of Tripoli, the Lebanese Forces, and even with officers of
the Israeli Golani brigade that had occupied the southern region of the
country since 1978, notwithstanding the fact that Syrian army and security
officers had the upper hand on production areas as well as strategic cross-
roads and domestic boundaries. Each group performed its share of opera-
tions and took its share of the profit. In that sense, there was an indisputable
collective interest in protracting the Lebanese war.
Drug networks not only operated across communal and military borders
but also were also connected to larger international networks. This helps
explain why, after the end of the war, drastic measures imposed by Syrian
authorities under pressure from the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration
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did not succeed in suppressing the lucrative drug business, even though they
had a dramatic effect on the peasantry. The brutal reduction of poppy culti-
vation and the incremental uprooting of hashish produced a long-term eco-
nomic crisis; whatever the promises of the Lebanese government or the am-
bitious alternative development projects of international agencies such as the
United Nations Development Program, peasants who returned to traditional
agriculture were unable to resist competition from imported Syrian and Jor-
danian fruit and vegetables. About ten years later, it should have come as
no surprise that, as several sources indicated, poppy cultivation was back in
the Beqaa Valley.28
There has been no sign that clandestine laboratories have been closed
or drug networks dismantled. They now feed upon external production
zones—mainly in southern Turkey and the Caucasus—and are linked to
banking circuits in Lebanon and industrial countries.29 The demobiliza-
tion of the militia organizations that had fostered and protected local drug
networks resulted in the networks’ long-term integration into international
drug marketing rings. In Lebanon itself, the men who had led the game for
fifteen years kept hold of the local segments of the networks, albeit in their
new guise as civilian businessmen and political bosses. What postwar offi-
cial measures induced was not a break from the war economy but its mod-
ernization and routinization.
Beyond the significant distinction between legal and illegal products, the
same evolution occurred with regard to several public goods. The importa-
tion and distribution of crude oil for the two state refineries in Tripoli and
Zahrani (Sidon), and the import of oil derivatives for the Dora reservoir
near Beirut, escaped state monopoly as early as 1976; at that time, militia
groups associated with the Syrian president’s brothers began importing
without state licenses. After the two refineries (located in Sunni and Shiite
zones, respectively) had been destroyed by Christian fire, the minister of
industry and oil—who had close links to the Christian militias—deemed it
technically impossible to bring them back into use. Almost overnight, stor-
age units in the central Christian regions (Dora, Nahr el-Mott and Dbayeh)
became the country’s main supply centers for fuel, supplying other regions
on the basis of intermilitia agreements. However, the Caisse des Carburants
34 Elizabeth Picard
28Al-Nahar, August 13, 2001.
29Between 1995 and 1997, the Lebanese authorities announced several arrests of co-
caine dealers linked to Brazilian and Colombian networks, while rumors soared about
drug-money laundering by local banks.
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(State Fuel Fund), whose ledgers had been “accidentally” burned in 1977,
kept subsidizing oil products until 1986, even though the militias were
openly collecting their own taxes and even reexporting to neighboring
countries.30 Finally, postwar governments resolved to deregulate the oil
trade, legalize a dozen private oil terminals established along the coast,
and accept the transformation of the state monopoly into a oligopoly of
six private companies, each linked to an ex-militia group.
For oil, as for drugs, individual or collective greed helps to explain the
development of the war economy; this greed was associated with, or grafted
onto, the exceptional financial expenses incurred by the warring militias
or their leaders. In return, economic logic contributed to extending and in-
creasing the level of fighting, even at the expense of the security of the civil-
ians associated with each group; this logic took advantage of the discourse
of rupture and intersectarian hostility and drew from deeply rooted creed
disputes. Greed in the defense (or promotion) of creed could not have been
satisfied if it had not been for the cooperation of individuals willing to trust
one another beyond apparently intractable identity and ideological differ-
ences, in order to maximize their gains. How else could we explain the
shelling of the oil terminal of Zahrani by the pro-Israeli South Lebanon
army, which overnight in 1988 raised the price of oil imported (and sold) by
its local adversary, the Shiite militia Amal? What of the often-told story of
Camille Chamoun, the elderly leader of the Christians, coming to his enemy,
Bachir Gemayel, in the wake of the crushing defeat of his militia by the
young man’s Lebanese Forces in 1980, and offering peace “as long as he
could keep free use of his illegal harbor at Dbayeh?”31
On the whole, there was a direct relation among military escalation, arms
expenditures, and the reliance of nearly all militia groups on the traffick-
ing of drugs and various other goods. Progressively, as the legitimacy of the
cause eroded among the population associated with each sectarian group
and the corresponding resources drawn from civilians ran dry, smuggling
and trafficking provided a larger part of militia finances. As years passed
and the war went on, these activities tended to develop an economic logic
of their own, disconnected from the driving ideal of group mobilization.
Consequently, the logic of seeking rapid and uncontrolled profit persisted
after the war, even after the demobilization of the militias and the official
reconciliation of the warring sectarian groups.
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From Territorial Illusion to Land Rent
Examining the function of territory and land during the Lebanese civil war
sheds another interesting light on the complex relationship between creed
and greed as well as on Lebanon’s specific political economy. The hege-
monic discourse of sectarian groups based their militia strategy on secu-
rity priorities and an obsession with communal homogeneity; this strategy
resulted in several ethnic cleansing operations, although the term was not
used at the time. The Christian central regions under the Lebanese Forces
and the Druze region under the PSP constituted the most blatant examples
of such cleansing, with the heavy use of religious and political symbols to
mark homogenized territory, a much publicized discourse of threat (against
internal dissidents) and fear (of alien enemies), and the dramatic expulsion
of minority groups.32 In some cases, sectarian nationalism was strong
enough within the society, and especially among intellectuals, to nearly
lead to secession.33 In most cases, it led to the creation of separate public
administrations and services, the construction of new local infrastructure,
and the reshaping of economic activities.
That said, internal feuds within each of the “liberated” statelets and
active transsectarian cooperation outside belied the territorial illusions
aroused by militia leaderships. After two years of fighting, when the bound-
aries had been solidly established and the crossing points neatly controlled,
kidnapping, car bombs, and gang fighting within each zone caused more
civilian losses than did reciprocal shelling.
The behavior of the militia leaders as well as their confessions made
obvious the economic rationale behind the territorial fragmentation of the
war. Such fragmentation favored the emergence and development of alter-
native urban and commercial centers, whose prosperity fluctuated accord-
ing to the economic climate of the moment.34 The construction of internal
frontiers generated revenues in several ways: through the levying of cus-
36 Elizabeth Picard
32Elizabeth Picard, “The Dynamics of the Lebanese Christians: from the Paradigm
of the ‘âmmiyât to the Paradigm of Hwayyek,” in Christian Communities in the Arab
Middle East, ed. A. Pacini (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1998); Judith Harik, “Change
and Continuity among the Lebanese Druze Community: The Civil Administration of the
Mountain, 1983–1990,” Middle Eastern Studies 29, no. 3 (1993).
33Percy Kemp, “La stratégie de Bachir Gemayel,” Hérodote (1983): 29–30. 
34Elisabeth Longuenesse, “Guerre et décentralisation urbaine au Liban: Le cas de
Zghorta,” in URBAMA: Petites villes et villes moyennes dans le monde arabe (Tours: Ur-
bama, 1986); William Harris, “The View from Zahleh: Security and Economic Condi-
tions in the Central Bekaa, 1980–1985,” Middle East Journal, 39, no. 3 (Summer 1985).
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toms duties, the artificial creation of local shortages leading to skyrocketing
prices and windfall profits, and even the lengthening of transportation dis-
tances that increased transport fees. As the state retreated, the partitioning
of Lebanon among militias nearly reproduced the old Ottoman divisions
of military-controlled fiscal domains (iqtâ’), each with its borders and cus-
toms checkpoints: Bater and Monteverde for the PSP, the Awali bridge
north of Sidon for the Nasserists, the Qasmieh bridge for Amal, Barbara for
the Lebanese Forces, and so on. Each of these crossing points generated
significant revenues for the militias that controlled it.
At the leadership level within each territory, ruptures and clashes re-
sulted more from competing interests than from ideological or strategic
contention; both factors were not insignificant, however, as illustrated by
the competition between Amal and Hizbollah for support from various Iran-
ian centers of power after 1982, or by the strong interest in controlling the
racket of the northern cement factories, an objective that motivated the
“punitive” expedition of the Lebanese Forces against the fiefdom of their
Christian rival, former president Frangieh, in 1978.35 The same factors were
present in the early destruction of downtown Beirut in 1975–76. Though
several assailants were motivated by their fury against unfair economic
advantages and their fascination with the destruction of the symbols of con-
sensus life,36 the destruction was accompanied by the systematic looting
of shops and harbor warehouses and was followed by the selling of stolen
goods all over the country and in Syria.
Thus, economic lust combined with identity mobilization in the destruc-
tion of certain districts and in their transformation into long-term disaster
areas. Throughout fifteen years of insecurity, luxurious homes, fashion-
able shops, and expensive leisure establishments such as restaurants and
nightclubs deserted the brisk, modern, and confessionally mixed area in
west Beirut, and moved to the city’s (Christian) eastern part and northern
suburbs. As targeted shelling and military roadblocks helped suppress west
Beirut’s economic life, the rise of fundamentalist religious movements in
this Muslim-dominated area motivated Muslim contractors and business-
men to invest preferably in the Christian part of the city and to launch joint
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ventures with their Christian fellow countrymen; these, in return, welcomed
their capital, in spite of the xenophobic discourse of the local religious
authorities.37
Another illuminating case involves the way the land occupied by Pales-
tinian refugee camps was dealt with during and after the war. From the very
beginning of the war, ethnic antagonism lay at the core of the refusal to
settle (tawtin) Palestinian refugees and their political and military institu-
tions in Lebanon. To Christians as well as to the Shia who fought the Pales-
tinian encroachment of state authority, the Palestinian fidayin (guerrillas)
and the masses of Palestinian refugees represented the negative and un-
bearable “other,” stirring up powerful popular hostility. As a result, the siege
of the refugee camp of Tell ez-Zaatar by Christian militias (1976), the mas-
sacre of Sabra and Chatila by the Lebanese Forces (1982), and the war
fought by Shiite militias against the southern suburb Palestinian camps in
1985–88 were among the bloodiest and merciless episodes of the civil war.
Hostility did not diminish after the war, and today resentment toward the
Palestinians might be the strongest feeling shared by Lebanese of all sects.
Underneath this “creed” aspect, however, loomed another dimension, in-
volving private and public maneuvers to get hold of the camps’ much cov-
eted land located in the close-in suburbs of Beirut and to resettle the
refugees in remote areas or even abroad. The desire for land revenue thus
tells another story and sheds a different light on wartime hostilities.38
One might perhaps suspect economic premeditation in the treatment of
the Palestinians, as in other campaigns of forced displacement (and exter-
mination) that unfolded one after another in an apparent emotional fury of
reprisals, affecting one-quarter to one-third of the country’s population at
one time or another.39 These military campaigns were related to the high
value of land and the heavy demographic pressure on the eve of the civil war
in highly disputed zones of the coastal strip, such as Beirut’s central dis-
38 Elizabeth Picard
37E.g., after the war, Maronite and Greek Catholic clerics continued to forbid the
selling of land to ghuraba (west Beirut inhabitants)—foreigners to the region, even if
they were of Lebanese nationality. The clerics conjured up the specter of the “islamiza-
tion” of the land.
38Palestinians in Lebanon: Conference Report (Oxford: Center for Lebanese Studies,
1996).
39According to Ali Faour, Geography of the Displacement [in Arabic] (Beirut, Naufal,
1995), 900,000 Lebanese were displaced during the war. The Ministry of the Displaced
put the figure at 450,000. See Ministry of the Displaced, The Question of the Displacement
in Lebanon 1976–1990 [in Arabic] (Beirut: Ministry of the Displaced, 1992).
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trict and the regions directly north and south of the capital. In these areas—
including the Beirut suburbs, the eastern villages surrounding Sidon, and
some quarters of Tripoli—the process of expulsion was notably violent and
systematic. At the same time, a relative sectarian pluralism persisted in sev-
eral other regions.
The craving for land did not decline during the war, as militia leaders,
surrounded by entrepreneurs and prone to Weberian “economy-oriented”
initiative strove to secure and enlarge their territorial and hence economic
power.40 From at least the early 1980s, developers showed an interest in
land recovery and reconstruction in the above-mentioned areas. With the
agreement of the local militias—and often with their financial partici-
pation—they launched a variety of speculative projects, including coastal
land reclamation, marinas, high-rise luxury hotels, gated communities, and
shopping malls. Some of these projects, such as the line of seaside resorts
extending twenty miles north of Beirut in the Christian zone, were com-
pleted and operational before the end of the war. Others—such as the Soli-
dere private real estate operation initiated by Prime Minister Rafic Hariri
to rebuild Beirut’s destroyed central district—could not be implemented
because of continuous fighting and were only undertaken after the war.
Wartime constituted an exceptional period and allowed exceptional ini-
tiatives to be taken in the domain of land and real estate dealing. In many
towns and villages, official registers disappeared in fires and other violent or
obscure circumstances. During more than half the war’s fifteen years, fight-
ing prevented civil servants from coming to their offices. Although all of them
continue to receive their salaries, many, in fact, had joined the militias or left
the country. Those who did report to work took orders not from state author-
ities but from militiamen, who were called at the time “de facto forces.”
In this environment, thousands of land transactions took place without
registration and without the payment of legal taxes (although hefty “taxes”
were paid to the de facto forces). Thousands of houses and apartments were
illegally occupied, either after owners had been violently expelled or when
displaced persons squatted in vacant buildings.41 Thousands of acres of
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366, 382.
41After the war, most of the money spent by the governmental Fund for the Dis-
placed ($250,000 in the Beirut Central District alone, according to the private group
Solidere) was distributed to squatters in order to make them leave, rather than to the dis-
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empty land were built up without permits, especially in Beirut’s suburbs,
where hundreds of thousands of southern villagers took refuge after succes-
sive Israeli invasions (1978, 1982). After the war, this type of construction
raised the thorny question of regularization.42 Ministers operating without
controls in this chaotic environment enacted exceptional decrees that allowed
for local or national infringement of zoning laws,43 the pillage of natural re-
sources,44 and the privatization of the public domain and public infrastruc-
tures.45 In a country long famous for its successful laissez-faire policies,
sheer violence became the ultimate authority and the shortest road to profit.46
Because reliable documentation is lacking, no study has detailed the
changes in land and real estate holdings that occurred during and because
of the war. Nevertheless, in postwar Lebanon, booming land and real estate
speculative transactions contrasted with the steady emigration of labor
power and a continuous decline in GNP.47 This suggests that war transactions
40 Elizabeth Picard
42Wafa Charaf ed-Din, “L’habitat illégal dans la banlieue-sud,” in Reconstruire Bey-
routh, ed. Nabil Beyhum (Lyon: Maison de l’Orient, 1991).
43Elie el-Achkar, Réglementations et formes urbaines: Le cas de Beyrouth (Beirut:
Cermoc, 1998).
44The Council of the South, a state institution headed since its creation in 1984 by
Amal leader Nabih Berri, allowed a Shiite diamond dealer from Sierra Leone to mine
sand off the beaches of Tyre. Similarly, large-scale mining of quarries by private entre-
preneurs linked to, and protected by, militia groups began during the war and continued
during the reconstruction period. The government failed to adopt the regulations called
for by environmentalists in the 1990s, for (ex-militia) ministers and members of Parlia-
ment had a direct interest in the business. Karam Karam, “Les associations: Défense de
l’environnement et recomposition d’un nouvel espace public,” in Reconstruction et
Réconciliation au Liban, ed. E. Huybrechts and C. Douayhi (Beirut: Cermoc, 1999).
45Ten years before Prime Minister Hariri granted a concession in central Beirut in
1993 to Solidere, a private group in which he himself was one of the biggest sharehold-
ers, President Amine Gemayel (1982–88) authorized private developers related to the
Lebanese Forces to embank the shore 15 miles north of Beirut and gave them posses-
sion of 80 percent of the reclaimed land. Prime Minister Hariri and Minister of Interior
Michel el-Murr (himself an ex-member of the Lebanese Forces) insisted on the continu-
ation of the project in the 1990s, despite criticism from the Council of State. See Henri
Eddé, Le Liban d’où je viens (Paris: Buchet-Chastel, 1997); and Najah Wakim, The Black
Hands [in Arabic] (Beirut: Sharikat al-Matbu’at lil-Tawzi’ wal-Nashr, 1998).
46Between 1987 and 1989, the Lebanese Forces dumped toxic chemical wastes from
Italy in several mountain and coastal locations in the region they controlled, for which
they were paid about $80 million.
47Ten years after the war, about half of Lebanon’s GNP was immobilized in a frag-
ile construction bubble. See Georges Corm, Reconstruction and Public Welfare [in Ara-
bic] (Beirut: Mu’assasat al-Abhath al-Madiniyah, 1996); Natacha Aveline, Marchés
fonciers et immobiliers à Beyrouth (Beirut: Cermoc, 2000). Such a rent system resulted
in a constant rise in costs, as opposed to the stagnation (or reduction) of production.
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did not constitute a sui generis process, whatever the superimposed collec-
tive rhetoric about the necessity to separate sectarian groups or the under-
lying financial appetites of the warlords. Rather, such transactions were in
accordance with a long historical process that continued throughout the war
and accelerated during the reconstruction period, as postwar Lebanon re-
mained a nearly tax-free country for land and real estate investors. Indeed,
for centuries during the Ottoman Empire, domination over a community’s
land and its population, through tax collection in the name of the state and
thanks to an exceedingly unequal share of crops, had been the basis for the
political power of Lebanese bosses. Land remained the first material source
of enrichment and symbolic source of prestige at the time of independence
because Lebanon’s economy remained driven by rent, derived principally
from banking deposits and land.48
This history explains why the use of land by warring factions was related
to the conservation of, loss of, and struggle for power among the elite and
ultimately to the postwar reshuffling of the Lebanese polity. The apparent
dichotomy between, on the one hand, ethnic division and hostility and, on the
other, a shared, “secular” (nonsectarian) lust for land was resolved on the
ground by intersectarian violence and the consequent redistribution of land
in Lebanon. The long-term process of land accumulation in Lebanon was
accelerated during the war as a result of the deepening of intersectarian dis-
trust as well as to individual strategies of rent seeking.
Emigration, Diaspora, and Sectarian Politics
When dealing with the determinants of the civil war and its prolongation for
fifteen years at the expense of all segments of society, one must certainly
take into account the human factor. Because of a lack of natural and mineral
resources, labor power has always been the main asset of the Lebanese
economy, its real capital and comparative advantage in a Middle East re-
gion where education and professional skills lagged far behind those of in-
dustrial nations. In the two decades preceding the civil war, Lebanon, the
“merchant Republic,” had taken the best advantage of the rise in Arab oil
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exports and the rapid development of the Gulf countries. Lebanon provided
all kind of services, from banking to leisure and health care, to Emirati and
Saudi societies, and it also sent hundreds of doctors, engineers, and teach-
ers to fill the expertise gap in the oil-rich monarchies. Several economists
argue that Lebanon’s comparative advantage in expertise was rapidly de-
creasing in the late 1960s, and that the much-praised Lebanese miracle
was already threatened because of the mediocre record of its educational
sector, the growing imbalance in the urbanization process, and the blatant
intersectarian inequalities mentioned above.49
On the eve of the war, émigrés’ remittances, reflecting a historical trend
that had already become dramatic at the time of World War I, provided one-
third of the country’s resources, an exceptionally high level of external de-
pendency.50 The trend accelerated during the fifteen years of war, as eco-
nomic destruction and physical danger combined to provoke massive
emigration, whether temporary or permanent.51 But emigration did not stop
in the following decade, when stagflation, a high level of unemployment
(20 to 30 percent of the active population), and a sharp decline of minimum
wages caused the departure of young degree holders.52 The “Lebanese mir-
acle,” if it had existed at all, had disappeared in the upheaval of war. Nor
could it be revived, because in the meantime, neighboring Arab countries
had become directly absorbed into the world economy.
Observing the effects of emigration on the Lebanese civil war supports
need, greed, and creed theories of armed conflict. On the one hand, the
Lebanese diaspora became a major source of financial support for the im-
poverished civilian population as well as for greedy warlords. The emigra-
tion removed about $40 billion from Lebanon,53 and this capital flight was
42 Elizabeth Picard
49According to Toufiq Gaspard, an economic consultant for the United Nations
Development Program (personal communication, Beirut, May 2001), only 20 percent
of the Lebanese prewar degree holders had studied past elementary school. In 1970,
45 percent of the Lebanese were still living in small villages, while 45 others had moved
directly to Beirut. In 1970, 45 percent of the Lebanese were still living in small villages,
while 45 others had moved directly to Beirut.
50Migrants’ remittances accounted for 22 percent of the GNP in 1950, and up to
33 percent in 1975. Gaspard, personal communication.
51According to World Bank estimates, about 200,000 professional and skilled
Lebanese sought employment in other countries between 1975 and 1990. This is 7.33 per-
cent of the 1974 population. Eken et al., Economic Dislocation, 5.
52The decline of minimum wages was 80 percent in real terms between 1981 and
1993. Eken et al., Economic Dislocation, 17.
53Estimation by Merrill Lynch, March 6, 1997. The Lebanese GDP was $8 billion
in 1974.
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accompanied by the dollarization of the national economy and spiraling
inflation, thus drastically diminishing local investments. With production
infrastructures destroyed, the goods and labor market dislocated, and the
Lebanese pound having lost nearly 1,000 times its value in relation to the
dollar, Lebanon’s GDP in the early 1990s plunged to 48 percent of its 1974
level.54 Those who remained in the country—families without resources,
the unemployed, and armed groups—relied heavily on expatriates’ remit-
tances. The revenues returned from the diaspora were estimated at the time
at $1.5 to $2.5 billion a year.55
This situation, in turn, helped perpetuate an exceptional economic order
sustained by continuous warfare, as militia networks supplanted traditional
solidarity channels. Before the war, relations between the homeland and the
diaspora were organized along family lines, as blood ties and patriarchal
order maintained a mixture of sentimental attachment and sheer materiel in-
terest. Now only the militias were able to grant emigrants access to their
local assets, whether in the form of bank deposits or land and real estate.
The militias’ control of money transactions and foreign currency move-
ments facilitated the laundering of illegal profits. Long after the fighting
ceased and security went back to normal, the Lebanese banking system re-
mained plagued by volatile and uncontrolled short-term deposits, a major-
ity of them by nonresidents. In that sense, the civil war not only reflected
the economic strategies of various actors; it also generated a new social and
economic order, which survived the final cease-fire.
Economic collapse and the dependence on outside resources were ag-
gravated by the number of additional people forced into exile at the end of
the war. The demobilization of the militia enforced by the government in
1991 proved a painful time for arm bearers, who in a moment lost their
source of revenue and social power.56 The refusal of the rank and file of
Hizbollah to turn back their arms in 1991 and their insistence to go on fight-
ing the Israeli occupation in the South were partly motivated by basic fi-
nancial needs, as well as by the dictates of their creed. For their part, hundreds
of ex-fighters of the Lebanese Forces had no choice but to emigrate as their
militia was disbanded and stigmatized as the spoiler of the restored national
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56Elizabeth Picard, The Demobilization of the Lebanese Militias (Oxford: Centre for
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consensus. Those who left Lebanon became the financial supporters of
those who remained in the country. However, the personal and financial
investments of war émigrés in their Lebanese homeland were altogether
volatile and divisive. After the war, expatriates remained reluctant to in-
vest in their country’s economy, beyond the support extended to their kin
and community. Those who did invest in Lebanon were often suspected of
contributing to the worst side of the Lebanese banking system: dollariza-
tion, a dangerous proportion of highly volatile deposits, and the presence of
dirty money.57
The financial support from the diaspora and new émigrés to fellow citi-
zens at home began to reflect a clear sectarian dimension and involve po-
litical aims. Expatriates did not extend their support only for reasons of
family, clan, or communal solidarity. Nor did they send their money for
the sole purpose of sharing huge, rapid financial gains with greedy local
warlords. Their financial support was also a by-product of what can be
called a diaspora complex, a phenomenon related to “creed”; it was a mix-
ture of nostalgia and remorse for being so far from the homeland’s danger,
shortsightedness compensated by the illusions of an invasive memory, ide-
ologization of domestic political stakes, and a violent mobilization dis-
course to cover up the absence of direct commitment.58
Colonies of Lebanese migrants around the world echoed and magnified
the conflict at home.59 A global geography of war mobilization outside
Lebanon could be mapped with Amal and then Hizbollah supporters in
West Africa, and Lebanese Forces supporters in Australia and the United
States, among others. The collection of money was organized on a sectarian
basis, thus enrolling every member of the expatriate community in support
of a warring sectarian group at home, irrespective of individual convictions.
Churches, mosques, and charity foundations played a militant role among
scattered Christian and Muslim communities, by collecting funds that were
44 Elizabeth Picard
57Economist Intelligence Unit, Lebanon Country Profile 2000 (London: Economist
Intelligence Unit, 2001).
58See Robin Cohen, Global Diasporas (London: UCL Press, 1997); Aline Angous-
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used as much to buy arms and pay militiamen as to bring relief to civilians.
On some occasions, diaspora communities even succeeded in mobilizing
public opinion and the government of the host country, as did the support-
ers of General Aoun after 1989 in France.60 After the Taif agreement of
November 1989 had imposed the suspension of hostilities on the ground,
tension, acrimony, and the refusal to acknowledge the new balance of
power within the restored political system persisted in the diaspora, fed
among other things by the growing discrepancy between the sectarian com-
position of Lebanese society and that of the diaspora.61
Seeing war from afar and judging the warring parties according to their
own memory of an idealized past, the Lebanese diaspora mobilized around
large political issues: relations with Israel, the role of Syria in the Lebanese
war and in postwar reconstruction, the (Christian and/or Arab) identity of
Lebanon, and the recovery of Lebanese sovereignty. Émigrés divided on
these themes (with a few exceptions) along sectarian lines, in accordance to
what they understood to be the prevalent division of the society and polity
in Lebanon. They saw the war mainly as an issue of sectarian balance and
brought their support to the local militias on a sectarian basis. As a conse-
quence, émigrés who retained a rather conservative image of their country
reentered the domestic political arena through sectarian solidarities, thus
contributing to the reproduction and confirmation of war cleavages. While
leading a modern and often secular life in the industrial countries in which
they had settled, they preserved an idealized image of Lebanon and culti-
vated a utopian design for its future. As a result of their special relation
to time through distance, they brought an uncompromising creed-based
dimension to the civil war and, by their inflexible militancy, helped prolong
the fighting.
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Putting the War in Historical Perspective
Examining the Lebanese economy’s three main resources—legal and ille-
gal goods, land, and labor power—in the prolongation of the civil war
draws our attention to the variable of time. It also requires us to use so-
ciology and history to come to a full understanding of the respective im-
portance of resources, their interrelation, and change over the course of
the war.
On the eve of the war, Lebanon was enjoying economic growth and un-
dergoing rapid social transformation. The potential of its tertiary and ser-
vice sector was large but had already been weakened by the decline of
Lebanon’s regional comparative advantage and the new balance of power
induced by the peace process between Egypt and Israel. In such an am-
bivalent situation, there was an undeniable economic dimension to the mo-
tivation of the warring parties. The dominant social classes chose to stir up
intersectarian conflict to defuse growing social tensions within each com-
munity and rally the masses under their patronage; meanwhile, exploited
and marginalized groups in search of compensation took aim at public and
private wealth, the centers of power, and especially its core—state institu-
tions. Conservatives and leftists fought over the level of salaries and size
of profits, the control of the market, and the balance between economic sec-
tors and between regions of the country. Both agendas, the conservative and
the revolutionary, became marginalized in the early months of the war, as
the productive economy collapsed when Beirut’s commercial district and
industrial zones were destroyed. From 1976 on, the political economy frame-
work of mobilization lost its momentum, to be replaced by communal and
subcommunal factions, each funded by rents from external (foreign state
support, emigrants’ remittances) or domestic (goods, land, and financial
speculation) sources.
Does this mean that the Lebanese civil war lost its economic dimension
after two years, or that, after that time, combatants were driven only by sec-
tarian antagonism and political contention—that social need was replaced
by sectarian creed as its motive until the end of the war? On the contrary.
Observation of the use of “primary” goods during the war—drugs and oil,
land, and labor power—reveals their embezzlement and exploitation by
new political and economic actors bound to armed groups and belonging
neither to the establishment nor the rebels. Most of these men came from
the rural or suburban lower middle classes. In the beginning, moved by re-
ligious conviction and drawn by personal loyalty, they had seen no alter-
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native to their enrollment in the war. Soon, they became able to impose
themselves on the traditional elite and the leaders in the contest, for they
had mastered an extra resource: armed violence organized on a large scale
and at a high level.
These new militia entrepreneurs seized opportunities to use public
means to private ends. They organized the shifting of the Lebanese econ-
omy from rent to predation in order to quickly accumulate wealth before
being integrated into the state elite at the end of the war: from legal trade
to illegal traffic, from securing land rent and émigrés’ remittances to loot-
ing private and public goods, and from the development of a national mar-
ket and public space to their replacement by segmented, monopolistic,
communal microspaces. Besides external factors (mainly the successive
shifts in the Syrian–Israeli balance of power) and other domestic factors
(the inability of the traditional elite to agree on constitutional reforms), the
protraction of the civil war owed much to the “greed” of militia leaderships.
This appears all the more blatant when one observes that some leaders
showed a willingness to go to the negotiation table earlier than others, de-
pending on the wealth they had accumulated much more than on their mil-
itary gains, as none could claim victory. Though the Shiite leadership of
Amal could take pride in having gained powerful governmental and public
administration positions, the Druze Parti Socialiste Progressiste had be-
come rather isolated, short of resources, and eager to settle its relation with
the state. For their part, the Lebanese Forces stubbornly continued fighting
until their defeat, as if they were expecting no postwar benefit—an expec-
tation that would be sadly fulfilled when they were finally outlawed in
1994. Personal tactics and the calculation of relative, rather than absolute,
gain certainly delayed the adoption and implementation of the final cease-
fire under Syrian patronage in December 1990.
The identification of economic factors and the study of economic mech-
anisms would be misleading, however, if not related to history, social logic,
and political processes. Economics tells us about the ways and means—
even the aims—of human activity; politics and political anthropology pro-
vide interpretations of the mental representations at the source of human
initiative; and history is necessary to understand where opportunities orig-
inate, why they changed, and how actors took them into account in a shift-
ing configuration of power. Thus, one needs to explore the social and po-
litical institutions underlying and favoring the development and protraction
of a “war system,” as well as the institutional changes adopted after the
war to minimize the revival of conflict.
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Militia entrepreneurs did not invent a new Lebanese economy, and even
less a “war economy.” Rather, they took advantage of the structure of op-
portunities offered by the Lebanese environment and distribution of power.
More precisely, they took advantage of the social institutions of patrimonial
domination that traditionally connected the leaders’ economic strategies to
the logic of their collective identities in the Ottoman period, when power
holders struggled to maintain their image of wealth and to insure its real-
location to diverse social categories in their community.62 In the Ottoman
districts that would become Lebanon in 1920, land, tax collection, and
trade were the main sources of wealth—not production. Official adminis-
trative procedures were subordinated to private interests and person-to-
person agreement. The public space and the market were divided into a
multiplicity of sectarian networks. Thus, patrimonial domination found
its justification in the reference that structured the whole social life—
sectarianism—and became its legitimization and empowerment in the juri-
dical mechanisms and constitutional institutions of the political system.
In the last quarter of the twentieth century, the Lebanese state, although
comparatively young, was supposed to have become a “nation-state” rid
of patrimonial values and practices, thanks to a modern administration and
institutions such as the judiciary and an elected parliament—all aimed at
turning Lebanese civilians from “clients” into citizens. Simultaneously,
the integration of the Lebanese market into international economic net-
works (in a pattern that presaged globalization) was supposed to facilitate
Lebanon’s adoption of the rules and procedures of modern capitalism.
However, behind the official discourse and the international optimism cel-
ebrating the country’s “modernization without revolution,”63 reality was
different. Neither state institutions nor market rules had been the object of
prior agreement between rival communal elites to overcome the sectarian
divide. Far from withering away, clientelism pervaded democratic institu-
tions and the state bureaucracy. It has lasted because the unequal exchanges
on which clientelism rested were quite economically efficient and politi-
cally adapted to indigenous representations of ethnic (family or sectarian)
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solidarity. Modernization has meant the reinvention, not the disappear-
ance, of tradition and its adaptation to the nation-state framework. As a con-
sequence, the Lebanese state developed as a nonautonomous arena where
the sectarian elites struggled for positions of power to enable redistribu-
tion to their clients.64 Because the economy was altogether externalized and
hardly productive, and the domestic market segmented along confessional
lines, the Lebanese transition to capitalism was protracted and distorted.65
No clear demarcation was drawn between the public domain and private in-
terests. Both the state and the market thus functioned in ways quite dis-
tinct from what ideal or typical models would suggest.66
It was not a halt in the practices inherited from the past and exacerbated
by the fighting that was decisive in ending the war, but rather a change in the
Syrian–Israeli strategic balance and an improvement in Syrian–American
relations. With the restoration of the state after the adoption of the Taif
agreement, the political system was reinstated after some minor procedural
changes and constitutional modifications.67 The sectarian division of power
was confirmed and strengthened, notwithstanding the radical change in
demographics. The political economy followed the same old rules and prac-
tices, with indispensable financial help from the diaspora and the new op-
portunities provided by the business of reconstruction.
After fifteen years of fighting, Lebanon’s domestic social and political
structures, political sectarianism, and unruly capitalism remained virtually
untouched. Political life returned to its prewar factional games, while sectar-
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ian bosses dominated the market.68 More than ever, the Lebanese political
system lacked a link between the constitutional references that provided for
the security of each sectarian community, and the unifying discourse of
civic loyalty to the state. The Taif agreement, like the Constitution of 1926,
failed to introduce cross-cutting modes of representation based on socio-
logical categories related to economic resources and need in order to com-
pensate for the flaws of the sectarian-consensus system based on cultural
resources and creed. The Second Republic proved unwilling to promul-
gate a civil personal status code and acknowledge a transsectarian public
space, while the ruling elite carefully avoided any kind of political alterna-
tion or channels for upward mobility that might challenge its domination.
The incorporation of militia lumpen-elite and new political entrepreneurs
into the traditional oligarchy did not represent a breach in the power-shar-
ing logic, but rather its consolidation. The opening of the market to newly
enriched factions neither restrained monopolistic and clientelist practices
nor limited public corruption. Thus, the civil war can be understood as the
military process through which new actors made their way into the spheres
of government and wealth, acquiring by force positions of power that were
made official in the postwar reconstruction. While physical violence was
their main instrument, the process lasted until a new domestic distribution of
power was finally established. But there was a major difference: the postwar
balance was based less on intra-elite compromise than on crude power com-
petition and an even deeper sectarian divide. Lebanon’s war was over, but
in the years that followed, the threat of civil strife loomed large.
Conclusion
As this chapter argues, understanding the Lebanese civil war and the con-
nections between its multiple aspects defies explanation based on one sin-
gle element. Though economic analysis and rational choice theory throw
new light on a conflict too often described as a “war of cultures,” these ap-
proaches do not diminish the importance of the war’s subjective dimensions
of creed, such as identity, faith, and group solidarity.
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The three important economic resources in the war—drugs and oil traf-
ficking, land acquisition, and expatriate remittances—all had financial
value for the combatants as well as a concrete effect on the intensification
and prolongation of the war. These resources also had a symbolic dimen-
sion, influencing the morale, ethics, and pugnacity of the warring parties
through the collective representations underlying resource use. Land in par-
ticular reflected a material as well as symbolic stake in the war. And beyond
providing financial support, the diaspora echoed and amplified the fears and
expectations that moved the warring factions at home. Hence, their role in
the war as well as in postwar reconstruction is better understood through the
perspective of sociological history.
Finally, need, creed, and greed were of different importance at different
periods of the war, with greed incrementally superseding need and creed
as the war continued. Whether each variable reflected a more economic or
more cultural dimension depended on its relation to time. Goods trafficking
and financial profits contributed to the intensification of the war’s violence,
while the competition for land and mobilization in the diaspora tended to
protract the war long after the cease-fire had been proclaimed.
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